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1. Introduction
The mechanism by which cooperation arises within populations of selﬁsh in-
dividuals has generated signiﬁcant research within the biological, social and
computer sciences. Much of this interest derives from the original research
of Axelrod and Hamilton1, and, in particular, the two computer tourna-
ments that Axelrod organised in order to investigate successful strategies
for playing the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD)2. These tournaments
were so signiﬁcant as they demonstrated that a simple strategy based on
reciprocity, namely tit-for-tat, was extremely eﬀective in promoting and
maintaining cooperation when playing against a wide range of seemingly
more complex opponents.
To mark the twentieth anniversary of the publication of this work,
these two computer tournaments were recently recreated (see http://www.
prisoners-dilemma.com/) with separate events being hosted at the 2004
IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computing (CEC’04) and the 2005 IEEE
Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG’05). To stim-
ulate novel research, the rules of Axelrod’s original tournaments were ex-
tended in two key ways. Firstly, noise was introduced, whereby the moves
of each player would be mis-executed with some small probability. Sec-
ondly, and most signiﬁcantly, researchers were invited to enter more than
one player into the round-robin style tournament. This second extension to
the original rules, prompted several researchers to enter teams of players
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into the tournament. This choice being motivated by the intuition that the
members of such a team could, in principle, recognise and collaborate with
one another in order to gain an advantage over other competing players.
This proved to be the case, and teams of players performed well in both
competitions. Indeed, a member of such a team, entered by the authors,
won the noisy IPD tournaments held at both events.
Now, for this approach to be eﬀective in practice, two key questions have
to be addressed. Firstly, the players, who have no access to external means
of communication, have to be able to recognise one another when they meet
within the IPD tournament. Secondly, having achieved this recognition, the
players have to adopt a strategy that increases the probability that one of
their own kind wins the tournament. In this chapter, we present our work
investigating these two questions. Speciﬁcally:
(1) We show how our players are able to use a pre-agreed sequence of
moves, that they make at the start of each interaction, to transmit a
covert signal to one another, and thus detect whether they are facing
a competing player or a member of their own team.
(2) We show that by recognising and then cooperating with one another,
the members of the team can act together to mutually improve their
performance within the tournament. In addition, by recognising and
acting preferentially toward a single member of the team, the team
can further increase the probability that this member wins the overall
tournament. In both cases, this can be achieved with a team that is
small in comparison to the population (typically less than 15%).
(3) Given this approach, we show with an experimental IPD tournament
that the performance of our team is highly dependent on the length
of the pre-agreed sequence of moves. The length of this sequence de-
termines both the cost and the eﬀectiveness of the signalling between
team members, and these factors contribute to an optimum sequence
length that is independent of both the size of the team and the number
of competing players within the tournament.
(4) Using the results of these experimental IPD tournaments, we show that
signalling with a pre-agreed sequence of moves, within the noisy IPD
tournament, is exactly analogous to the problem, studied in informa-
tion theory, of communicating reliably over a noisy channel. Thus we
demonstrate that we can implement error correcting codes in order to
further optimise the performance of the team.July 25, 2006 16:24 WSPC/Trim Size: 9in x 6in for Review Volume prisoner
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(5) Finally, we discuss how the results of these investigations guided the
design of the teams that we entered into the two recent IPD competi-
tions, and thus we follow this analysis with a discussion of the results
of these competitions.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section 2 describes the
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma setting and related work. Section 3 describes
the team players that we implemented in our investigations and section 4
describes the results of the experimental IPD tournaments that we imple-
mented. In section 5 we analyse these results and in section 6 we discuss
our use of coding theory to optimise the performance of the team. Finally,
we discuss the application of these techniques within the two computer
tournaments in section 7 and we conclude in section 8.
2. The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and Related Work
In our investigations, we consider the standard Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
(IPD) as used by Axelrod in his original computer tournaments. Thus, in
each individual IPD game, two players engage in repeated rounds of the
normal form Prisoner’s Dilemma game, where, at each round, they must
choose one of two actions: either to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). These
actions are chosen simultaneously and depending on the combination of
moves revealed, each player receives the payoﬀ indicated in the game matrix
shown in table 9.1. For example, should player 1 cooperate (C) whilst player
2 defects (D), then player 1 receives zero points whilst player 2 receives ﬁve
points. The scores of each player in the overall IPD game are then simply
the sum of the payoﬀs achieved in each of these rounds. In our experiments
we assume that each IPD game consists of 200 such rounds, however, this
number is of course unknown to the players participating.
As in the original tournaments, a large number of such players (each
using a diﬀerent strategy to choose its actions in each individual IPD game)
are entered into a round-robin tournament. In such a tournament, each
player faces every other player (including a copy of itself) in separate IPD
games, and the winner of the tournament is the player whose total score,
summed over each of these individual interactions, is the greatest.
Given this problem description, the goal of Axelrod’s original tourna-
ments was to ﬁnd the most eﬀective strategies that the players should adopt.
Whilst in a single instance of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game it is a domi-
nant strategy for each player to defect, in the iterated game this immediate
temptation is tempered by the possibility of cooperation in future rounds.July 25, 2006 16:24 WSPC/Trim Size: 9in x 6in for Review Volume prisoner
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Table 9.1. Pay-oﬀ matrix of the
normal form Prisoner’s Dilemma
game.
Player 2
C D
Player 1
C 3,3 0,5
D 5,0 1,1
This is often termed the shadow of the future14, and, thus, in order to per-
form well in an IPD tournament, it is preferable for a player to attempt
to establish mutual cooperation with the opponent. Thus, strategies based
on reciprocity have proved to be successful, and, indeed, the simplest such
strategy, tit-for-tat (i.e. start by cooperating and then defect whenever the
opponent defected in the last move) famously won both tournaments2.
More recent research has extended this reciprocity based approach, and
has lead to strategies that out-perform tit-for-tat in general populations. For
example, Gradual5 is an adaption of tit-for-tat that incrementally increases
the severity of its retaliation to defections (i.e. the ﬁrst defection is punished
by a single defection, the second by two consecutive defections, and so on).
Likewise, Adaptive15 follows the same intuition as Gradual but addresses
the fact that the opponent’s behaviour may change over time and thus a
permanent count of past defections may not be the best approach. Rather,
it maintains a continually updated estimate of the opponent’s behaviour,
and uses this estimate to condition its future actions.
However, this reciprocity is challenged within the noisy IPD tourna-
ment. Here, there is a small possibility (typically around 1 in 10) that the
moves proposed by either of the players is mis-executed. Thus a player who
intended to cooperate, may defect accidentally (or vice versa)a and this
noise makes maintaining mutual cooperation much more diﬃcult. For ex-
ample, a single accidental defection in a game where two players are using
the tit-for-tat strategy, will lead to a series of mutual defections in which
each player scores are reduced. This detrimental eﬀect is often resolved by
aNote that this noise can be implemented in two diﬀerent ways: either the cooperation
is actually mis-executed as a defection, or it is simply perceived by the other player as a
defection. The diﬀerence between these two implementations results in diﬀerent payoﬀs
to the players in that round on the IPD game. Whilst this does result in slightly diﬀerent
scores in the overall IPD tournament, it does not signiﬁcantly eﬀect the results, as, in
general, the performance of a player is determined by its actions in the moves that follow
either the real or perceived defection. In our experiments, we use the ﬁrst implementation
and assume that noisy moves are actually mis-executed.July 25, 2006 16:24 WSPC/Trim Size: 9in x 6in for Review Volume prisoner
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implementing more generous strategies which do not retaliate immediately.
For example, tit-for-two-tats (TFTT) will only retaliate after two successive
defections3,4 and generous tit-for-tat (GTFT) only retaliates a small per-
centage of the times that tit-for-tat would4. However, whilst these strategies
manage to maintain mutual cooperation when playing against similar gen-
erous strategies, their generosity is also vulnerable to exploitation by more
complex strategies. Thus eﬀective strategies for noisy IPD tournaments
must carefully balance generosity against vulnerability to exploitation, and
in practise, this is diﬃcult to achieve.
Now, the possibility of entering a team of players within a noisy IPD
tournament oﬀers an alternative to this reciprocity based approach. If the
members of the team are able to recognise one another, they can uncon-
ditionally mutually cooperate and thus do not need to retaliate against
defections that are the result of mis-executed moves. In addition, by de-
fecting against players who they do not recognise as fellow team members,
they are immune to exploitation from these competing players. As such,
this approach resembles the notion of kin selection from the evolutionary
biology literature, where individuals act altruistically toward those that
they recognise as being their genetic relatives7,8.
However, to use this approach in practise, we must address two speciﬁc
issues. Firstly, we must enable the players to recognise one another and we
do so by using a pre-agreed sequence of moves that each player makes at
the start of each IPD interaction. Secondly, since our goal is to ensure that
one member of the team wins the tournament, we explicitly identify one
team member as the team leader, and have the other team members favour
this individual. We describe these steps, in more detail, in the next section.
3. Team Players
Thus, as described in the previous section, we initially implement a team
of players who recognise one another through the initial sequence of moves
they make at the start of each IPD interaction. To this end, each team
player uses a ﬁxed length binary code word to describe this initial sequence
of moves. Speciﬁcally, we denote 0 as defect and 1 as cooperate, and the
binary code word indicates the ﬁxed sequence of moves that the player
should make, regardless of the actions of the opponent. This binary code
word is known to all members of the team, and by comparing the moves
of their opponents against this code word, players within the team can
recognise if they are playing against another member of the team or againstJuly 25, 2006 16:24 WSPC/Trim Size: 9in x 6in for Review Volume prisoner
6 A. Rogers, R.K. Dash, S.D. Ramchurn, P. Vytelingum & N.R. Jennings
Team Member
‘team member code’
-
- CCCCCCCC recognise team member
DDDDDDDD otherwise.
Fig. 9.1. Diagram showing the sequence of actions played by each of the team members.
an unknown opponentb.
Now, whenever a team member meets another team member within the
IPD tournament, they can recognise one another and then cooperate with
one another unconditionally. In addition, the team members can recognise
when they are playing against a competing player and then defect contin-
ually (see ﬁgure 9.1). In this way, since the team players no longer have to
reciprocate any mis-executed moves in order to maintain cooperation, they
achieve close to the maximum possible score whenever they play against
other team members. In addition, since they defect against competing play-
ers, they are also immune to exploitation from these players. Thus given a
suﬃcient number of team members within the IPD tournament, the team
players perform well, compared to reciprocity based strategies.
However, our goal is to form a team that maximises the probability that
one of its members will be the most successful player within the IPD tourna-
ment. Thus, we can improve the performance of the team by identifying one
of the team members as the team leader, and allowing the other ordinary
team members to act preferentially towards this team leader. Thus, when
the ordinary team members encounter the team leader, they continually
cooperate, whilst allowing the team leader to exploit them by continually
defecting. In this way, whilst competing players derive the minimum possi-
ble score in interactions with the ordinary team members, the team leader
derives the maximum possible score in these same interactions. Hence, by
allowing the team leader to exploit them, the ordinary team members sac-
riﬁce their own chance of winning the tournament, but by changing the
tournament environment, they are able to increase the chance that the
team leader will winc.
bNote that this recognition will not be perfectly reliable; the code word may be corrupted
by noise or competing players may accidentally make a sequence of moves that matches
the team code word. These are eﬀects that we explicitly consider in section 6.
cThus the team that we implement is similar to the ‘master’ and ‘slave’ approach sug-
gested by Delahaye and Mathieu6. However, unlike this example, where the slaves wereJuly 25, 2006 16:24 WSPC/Trim Size: 9in x 6in for Review Volume prisoner
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Team Leader
‘team leader code’ -
-
-
CCCCCCCC
recognise team member DDDDDDDD
recognise team leader
CC – TFT – otherwise.
Team Member
‘team member code’ -
-
-
CCCCCCCC
recognise team member CCCCCCCC
recognise team leader
DDDDDDDD otherwise.
Fig. 9.2. Diagram showing the sequence of actions played by each of the team players.
The case above describes the instances in which the team leader en-
counters another team member. However, when the team leader encounters
any other competing players it should adopt some default strategy. Clearly,
using the best performing strategy available will increase the chances of the
team leader winning the tournament. However, since our purpose here is to
demonstrate the factors that inﬂuence the eﬀectiveness of the team, rather
than to optimise a single example case, in the investigations that we present
here, we use tit-for-tat as this default strategy. As such, tit-for-tat is well
understood, and whilst it does not exploit other strategies as eﬀectively
as the more recently developed alternatives discussed in the previous sec-
tion, it is immune to being exploited itself. Thus in the case that the team
leader does not recognise another team player, it cooperates on the next
two moves in an attempt to reestablish cooperation and then continues by
playing tit-for-tat for the rest of the interaction.
Finally, since the rules of the IPD tournament mean that each player
must play against a copy of themselves, we also enable the team leader to
recognise and cooperate with a copy of itself. Thus, the actions of both the
ordinary team members and the team leader are shown schematically in
ﬁgure 9.2. Note, that it is not strictly necessary to implement two diﬀerent
codes (i.e. one for the team leader and one for ordinary team members),
however, we do so to reduce the chances of a competing player exploiting
the ordinary team members (see section 7 for a more detailed discussion).
simple strategies that could potentially be exploited by any member of the population,
all of our team players explicitly recognise one another and condition their actions on
this recognition.July 25, 2006 16:24 WSPC/Trim Size: 9in x 6in for Review Volume prisoner
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4. Experimental Results
Now, given the team players described in the previous section, two immedi-
ate questions are posed: (i) how does the number of team players within the
population eﬀect the probability that the team leader does in fact win the
tournament? and (ii) how does the length of the code word (i.e. the length
of the initial sequence of moves that the team players use to signal to one
another) aﬀect the performance of the team leader? In order to address
these questions and to test the eﬀectiveness of the team, we implement an
IPD tournament (with and without noise) using a representative popula-
tion of competing players. To ensure consistency between diﬀerent compar-
isons within the literature, we adopt the same test population as previous
researchers5,11,15 and thus the population consists of eighteen players imple-
menting the base strategies used in the original Axelrod competition (e.g.
All C, All D, Random and Negative), simple strategies that play periodic
moves (e.g. periodic CD, CCD and DDC) and state-of-the-art strategies
that have been shown to outperform these simple strategies (e.g. Adaptive,
Forgiving and Gradual). A full list and description of the strategies adopted
by these players is provided in Appendix A.
We ﬁrst run this tournament, using this ﬁxed competing population,
whilst varying the number of team players within the population, from 2
to 5 (i.e. one team leader and 1 to 4 ordinary team members), and varying
the length of code word, L, from 1 to 16 bits. To ensure representative
results, we also average over all possible code words, and in total, we run
the tournament 1000 times and average the results. Since our aim is to
show the beneﬁt that the team has yielded, compared to the the default
strategy of the team leader (in this case tit-for-tat), we divide the total
score of the team leader by the total score of the player adopting the simple
tit-for-tat strategy. Thus, we calculate  ScoreLeader / ScoreTFT  and note
that the greater this value, the better the performance of the team. The
results of these experiments are shown in ﬁgure 9.3 for the noise free IPD
tournament and in ﬁgure 9.5 for the noisy IPD tournament. In these ﬁgures,
the experimental results are plotted with error bars, along with a continuous
best ﬁt curve (see section 5 for a discussion of the calculation of this line).
Now, in order to investigate the eﬀect of larger population sizes, we
also run experiments where we ﬁx the number of team players within the
population to be ﬁve (again composed of one team leader and four ordi-
nary team members), but then generate competing populations of diﬀer-
ent sizes by randomly selecting players from our pool of 18 base strate-July 25, 2006 16:24 WSPC/Trim Size: 9in x 6in for Review Volume prisoner
Error-Correcting Codes for Team Coordination 11
gies (always ensuring that we have at least one player using the tit-for-tat
strategy). We run the tournament 10000 (more than before as we must
also average over the stochastic competing population) and again calculate
 ScoreLeader / ScoreTFT . Figure 9.4 shows these results for the noise free
IPD tournament and ﬁgure 9.6 show results for the noisy IPD tournament
The results clearly indicate that, as expected, increasing the number
of team players, or more exactly, increasing the percentage of the popula-
tion represented by the team, improves the performance of the team (i.e.
increases  ScoreLeader / ScoreTFT ). In addition, in both the noise free
and noisy IPD tournaments there is clearly an optimum code word length
whereby the beneﬁt of the team decreases when the code word length is
longer or shorter than this optimum. Most signiﬁcantly, this optimum code
word length is clearly independent of both the size of the team and the
population. In addition, in the case of the noisy IPD tournament, the re-
sults are very sensitive to this optimum code word length and, overall, the
beneﬁt of the team is much less than that achieved in the noise free IPD
tournament. In the next section, we analyse these results and propose error
correcting codes to improve performance in the noisy IPD tournament.
5. Analysis
The optimum code word lengths observed in the previous experimental re-
sults are the result of a number of opposing factors. If we initially consider
the noise free IPD tournament, we can identify two such factors. The ﬁrst
represents the cost of the signalling between team players. As the length of
the code word is increased, the team players have less available remaining
moves in which to manipulate the outcome of the tournament and, thus,
this factor favours shorter code word lengths. However, for this signalling
to be eﬀective, the team players must be able to distinguish between com-
peting players and other team players. If the code word becomes too short,
it becomes increasingly likely that a competing player will through pure
chance make the sequence of moves that correspond to either of the code
words of the team players. Thus the second factor represents the eﬀec-
tiveness of the signalling. It has the opposite eﬀect of the ﬁrst and thus
favours longer code word lengths. The balance of these two opposing fac-
tors give rise to the behaviour seen in ﬁgures 9.3 and 9.4 where we observe
an optimum code length near seven bits; at greater lengths we observe an
approximately linear decrease in performance, whilst at shorter lengths, we
observe a more rapid decrease in performance.July 25, 2006 16:24 WSPC/Trim Size: 9in x 6in for Review Volume prisoner
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Thus, to calculate the probability of successful discrimination, Pd, we
consider that out of the 2L possible code words, one is required for the team
leader code and one for the team member code. Thus, when we consider
the average over all possible code words, this probability is given by:
Pd = 1 −
2
2L (1)
In the case of the probability of successful recognition, Pr, we require that
both code word sequences are played with no mis-executed moves. If the
probability of mis-executing a move is γ (in our case γ = 1/10), then this
probability is simply given by:
Pr = (1 − γ)2L (2)
Figures 9.7 and 9.8 show a comparison of these analytical results against the
probabilities measured from the experimental results presented in the last
section. Clearly the theoretical predictions match the experimental data
extremely welld and these results indicate that the beneﬁt of the team is
strongly dependent on the eﬀectiveness of the signalling between the team
members. Most surprising, is that in the case of the noisy IPD tournament,
with anything but the very shortest code word lengths, the chances of two
team players successfully recognising one another is extremely small. At
ﬁrst sight, this result suggests that the use of teams is unlikely to be very
eﬀective in noisy environments. However, the problem that we face here
(i.e. how to reliably recognise code words in the presence of mis-executed
moves), is exactly analogous to that studied in information theory of com-
municating reliably over a noisy channel. As such, we can use the results
of this ﬁeld (speciﬁcally error correcting codes), to increase the probability
that the team members successfully recognise one another, and thus, in
turn, increase the beneﬁt that the team will yield.
6. Error Correcting Codes
The problem of communicating reliably over a noisy channel, or in our case,
reliably recognising code words when moves of the IPD game are subject to
dFurther conﬁrmation of this analysis is provided by the observation that the best-ﬁt
lines shown in ﬁgures 9.3 to 9.6, are calculated by postulating that the shape of the line
is given by y = A + Bx + C
2x + D(1 − γ)2x. The coeﬃcients A, B, C and D are then
found via regression so as to minimise the sum of the squared error between observed
and calculated results. In the case of the noise free IPD tournament, the value of D is
ﬁxed at zero.July 25, 2006 16:24 WSPC/Trim Size: 9in x 6in for Review Volume prisoner
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cessfully discriminate between team members and other competing players
(i.e. increase Pd) and by increasing the probability that the team members
recognise one another successfully (i.e. increase Pr). However, it should not
increase the cost of the signalling such that this increase in eﬀectiveness is
lost. The need to limit the increase in the cost of signalling, and thus limit
the length of the encoded message, Lm, is the key factor in restricting our
choice of coding algorithm. As shown in ﬁgures 9.3 and 9.4, even with the
perfect recognition that is achieved in the noise free case, the performance
of the team begins to degrade when Lm > 7, and whilst many coding al-
gorithms exist, the vast majority generate message lengths far in excess of
this value12. Thus, our choice of coding algorithm is limited to the three
presented below:
(1) A single block Hamming code that takes a 4 bit code word and generates
a seven bit message that can be corrected for a single error.
(2) A two block Hamming code that simply concatenates two four bit words
and thus produces a fourteen bit message that can be corrected for a
single error in each 7 bit block.
(3) A [15,5] Bose-Chaudhuri-Hochquenghem (BCH) code that encodes a
ﬁve bit code word into a ﬁfteen bit message, but is capable of correcting
up to three errors.
Now, in each case, the probability of successfully discriminating between
team players and competing players is still determined by the initial code
word length (i.e. the decoding algorithm maps the 2Lm possible encoded
messages onto 2Lc possible code words), and thus, as before, is given by:
Pd = 1 −
2
2Lc (3)
However, the probability that the team players successfully recognise one
another is determined by the message length and by the error correcting
ability of the code. Thus, for the Hamming code with n blocks, this prob-
ability is given by the probability that less than two error occurs in each
seven bit encoded message:
Pr =
"
1 X
k=0
￿
k
7
￿
γk(1 − γ)7−k
#2n
(4)
For the [15,5] BCH code, the probability of recognition is given by consid-
ering that the code word can be correctly decoded if less than four errorsJuly 25, 2006 16:24 WSPC/Trim Size: 9in x 6in for Review Volume prisoner
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Table 9.2. Calculated results for the probability of discrimination, Pd, and the
probability of recognition, Pr, for three diﬀerent error correcting codes considered.
Direct Hamming BCH
L=3 1 block 2 blocks [15,5]
Lc – Code Word Length 3 4 8 5
Lm – Message length 3 7 14 15
Pd – Probability of Discrimination 0.750 0.875 0.992 0.937
Pr – Probability of Recognition 0.531 0.723 0.527 0.892
occur in the ﬁfteen bit encoded message, and thus:
Pr =
"
3 X
k=0
￿
k
15
￿
γk(1 − γ)15−k
#2
(5)
These calculated values are shown in table 9.2 for the three coding algo-
rithms considered, along with the original case results in which the direct
code words are used (we use the value of L = 3 which was shown to be
optimal for the noisy IPD tournament presented in section 4). Note, that
all of the coding algorithms result in improvements in Pd since they all im-
plement a code word of length greater than three. However, only the single
block Hamming code and the [15,5] BCH code improve upon Pr. In the case
of the two block Hamming code, the error correcting ability is not suﬃcient
to overcome the long message length that results. Of the three algorithms,
the [15,5] BCH code is superior; it creates the longest message length, yet
its error correcting ability is such that it also displays the best probabil-
ity of recognition. This result is conﬁrmed by implementing the diﬀerent
coding algorithms within the team players and repeating the experimental
noisy IPD tournament, with a ﬁxed competing population, described in
section 4. As before, to ensure representative results, we run the tourna-
ment 1000 times and average over all possible choices of code words. Table
9.3 shows the results of this comparison when 2 to 5 team players (i.e. one
team leader and 1 to 4 ordinary team members) are included within the
population. As expected, the [15,5] BCH code outperforms the others and,
in the case where there are ﬁve team members, the performance of the
[15,5] BCH algorithm is very close to the best achieved in the noise free
IPD tournament presented in ﬁgure 9.3.
Finally, we present results from implementing this [15,5] BCH code
in the noisy IPD tournament, again with a ﬁxed competing population.July 25, 2006 16:24 WSPC/Trim Size: 9in x 6in for Review Volume prisoner
Error-Correcting Codes for Team Coordination 17
Table 9.3. Experimental results for  Score Leader / Score TFT  for
the three diﬀerent error correcting codes considered here. Tournaments
are averaged over 1000 runs and the standard error of the mean is
±0.002.
Direct Hamming BCH
L=3 1 block 2 blocks [15,5]
Number of
Team Players
2 1.043 1.055 1.044 1.062
3 1.079 1.101 1.083 1.120
4 1.112 1.145 1.121 1.173
5 1.141 1.184 1.159 1.221
In table 9.4 we show the total scores achieved by each player when the
number of team players increases from 2 to 5. To enable comparison with
other populations, we normalise these scores and divide the total score
achieved by each player, by the size of the population and by the number
of rounds in each IPD game (in this case 200). Thus, the values shown
are the ranked average pay-oﬀ received by the player in each round of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Within this table, the competing players are de-
noted by the mnemonic given in Appendix A, the team leader is denoted
by LEAD and the ordinary team members by MEMB .
Clearly, as more team members are added to the population, they are
increasingly able to change the environment in which the team leader must
interact and thus they are able to inﬂuence the outcome of the tournament
in favour of the team leader. In three out of the four cases, the team leader
is in fact the winner of the tournament, despite the fact that this player is
based upon the tit-for-tat strategy that performs relatively poorly against
this population (see the results shown in Appendix A). In addition, these
results also clearly show that the mutual cooperation of the other team
members, also leads them to perform well. Indeed, when the team consists
of ﬁve (or more) such team members, all ﬁve occupy the top positions.
In table 9.5, rather than showing the averaged scores of the tournament
players, we present the probability that one of the team players actually
wins the overall noisy IPD tournament. In addition to the previous results
where the probability that a move was mis-executed was 1/10, we present
a range of values from 0 to 1/5. The results indicate that whilst we have
assumed a noise level of 1/10 throughout the analysis, our results are not
particularly sensitive to this value. Indeed, the more signiﬁcant factor is the
loss of performance of the competing players as the noise level increases.
The table shows that with just two team members and no noise, a teamJuly 25, 2006 16:24 WSPC/Trim Size: 9in x 6in for Review Volume prisoner
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Table 9.4. Experimental results showing the results of the noisy IPD tournament when
the team players implement a [15,5] BCH coding algorithm and there are increasing
numbers of team players (a)...(d). The tournaments are averaged over 1000 runs and
the standard error of the mean is ±0.002.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Player Score
GRAD 2.347
LEAD 2.344
ADAP 2.263
SMAJ 2.256
GRIM 2.239
ALLD 2.219
MEMB 2.219
TFT 2.207
TFTT 2.175
FORG 2.171
GTFT 2.160
PCD 2.138
PCCD 2.136
STFT 2.124
HMAJ 2.109
RAND 2.101
PAVL 2.099
PDDC 2.072
NEG 2.049
ALLC 1.996
Player Score
LEAD 2.427
GRAD 2.298
MEMB 2.246
MEMB 2.246
ADAP 2.228
SMAJ 2.221
GRIM 2.221
ALLD 2.192
TFT 2.168
TFTT 2.135
FORG 2.126
GTFT 2.114
PCD 2.091
STFT 2.090
HMAJ 2.084
PCCD 2.078
RAND 2.058
PAVL 2.047
PDDC 2.033
NEG 1.991
ALLC 1.934
Player Score
LEAD 2.503
MEMB 2.273
MEMB 2.272
MEMB 2.271
GRAD 2.256
ADAP 2.191
SMAJ 2.186
GRIM 2.181
ALLD 2.161
TFT 2.133
TFTT 2.099
FORG 2.086
GTFT 2.068
STFT 2.061
HMAJ 2.054
PCD 2.047
PCCD 2.027
RAND 2.013
PDDC 2.005
PAVL 2.004
NEG 1.938
ALLC 1.877
Player Score
LEAD 2.568
MEMB 2.296
MEMB 2.294
MEMB 2.294
MEMB 2.292
GRAD 2.218
ADAP 2.164
SMAJ 2.157
GRIM 2.156
ALLD 2.136
TFT 2.103
TFTT 2.062
FORG 2.054
STFT 2.036
GTFT 2.031
HMAJ 2.030
PCD 1.999
PCCD 1.982
RAND 1.969
PDDC 1.969
PAVL 1.966
NEG 1.886
ALLC 1.820
player will win the tournament just 3.4% of the time. However, as the noise
level increases, the performance of the other players within the tournament
degrades at a faster rate than that at which the eﬀectiveness of the signalling
between team members diminishes. At a noise level of 1/5 the same team
members win 70.2% of the time. Indeed with 3 or 4 team members, the
results are independent of the noise level within this range.
7. Competition Entry
The results of the previous sections clearly indicate that there is an advan-
tage to be gained by entering a team of players into the noisy IPD tourna-
ment. However, when using these results to actually design the players forJuly 25, 2006 16:24 WSPC/Trim Size: 9in x 6in for Review Volume prisoner
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Table 9.5. Experimental results showing the probability that one of the team
members wins the noisy IPD tournament. Results are for diﬀerent numbers
of team members and a range of noise levels. Results are averaged over 1000
tournament runs and the standard error of the mean for each result is ±0.5.
Noise Level (γ)
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Number of
Team Players
2 2.8 % 10.6 % 22.4 % 30.0 % 32.6 %
3 3.4 % 81.0 % 80.4 % 81.6 % 70.2 %
4 97.6 % 99.0 % 96.4 % 96.6 % 97.2 %
5 97.4 % 96.6 % 97.2 % 96.6 % 96.8 %
the IPD competition entries, a number of additional factors must be con-
sidered. Firstly, in our experimental investigations we have averaged over
all possible code words to produce representative results. However, for the
competition entry we must actually select two code words: one for the team
members and one for the team leader. Whilst the probability of recoginising
a team player is independent of the choice of code word (this is a property
of the codes that are implemented), the probability of succesfully discrimi-
nating between team and competing players is not. Clearly, code words that
are close (in Hamming distance) to the initial moves of competing players
are more likely to be corrupted by noise and thus falsely recognised. Thus
we must select code words that are most unlike the moves that we expect
to observe from competing players. Actually making this choice is compli-
cated by the fact that we do not know the strategies that the competing
players will use, and the moves that they make will themselves depend on
the actual code words that the team players use. Thus, we again use our
test population of eighteen default strategies, and by exhaustive test, we
select two code words which most often lead to the correct recognition of
team players and the correct discrimination of competing players.
Secondly, throughout these investigations, we have not considered the
possibility of another competing player learning the code words of the team
members and then attempting to exploit them. Within our competition en-
tries, we greatly reduce the possibility of this occurring by having each team
player monitor the behaviour of their opponent, in order to check that they
behave as expected. Thus, if an ordinary team member recognises their
opponent to be another ordinary team member, they check that the oppo-
nent does in fact cooperate in the subsequent rounds of the game. Should
the opponent attempt to defect (with some allowance for the possibility
of mis-executed moves), it is assumed that the opponent has been falselyJuly 25, 2006 16:24 WSPC/Trim Size: 9in x 6in for Review Volume prisoner
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recognised and thus the team member begins to defect to avoid the possi-
bility of being exploited. Given this additional checking, the only possibility
of exploitation is that a competing player learns the code word of the team
leader, and thus tricks the ordinary team members into allowing themselves
to be exploited. However, in the IPD tournament, this is extremely unlikely
to occur. The players within the tournament only interact with each other
once, thus, whilst a competing player may encounter several ordinary team
members, there is little possibility of them learning the code word of the
team leader in this single interaction. This is the reason for implementing
separate team member and team leader code words.
Finally, we must decide how many team members to submit into the
competition. Clearly, our results indicate that the larger the number of
players, the better the performance of the team leader. However, typically,
this number is limited by the rules of the competition (e.g. the rules of the
second IPD tournament capped this number at 20), and thus, we should
submit the maximum allowable number of players.
Thus, the teams that we entered into the two recent IPD competitions
held at the 2004 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computing (CEC’04)
and the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Games
(CIG’05), followed these guidelines and were successful. In the ﬁrst compe-
tition, we entered several teams, that used the single block Hamming code,
and a range of default strategies for the team leader. Whilst a few other
researchers entered teams of players, the policy was not widely adopted and
the team leader from the largest team won with a clear advantage.
In the second round of competitions we entered a single team using
the more complex [15,5] BCH coding scheme, and, as in our investigations
here, we used tit-for-tat as the default strategy of the team leader. In this
competition, separate noise free and noisy IPD tournaments were held, and
these tournaments were more competitive, as given the results of the ﬁrst
competition, many more researchers adopted the policy of submitting a
team of players. Within the noise free IPD tournament, three of the top
four positions were occupied by representatives of diﬀerent teams. However,
within the noisy IPD tournament, our team leader again won with a clear
advantage, despite using the tit-for-tat as a default strategy. The other
teams entered into this tournament performed poorly compared to the noise
free IPD tournament. Thus, these results clearly illustrate the advantage
that the use of error-correcting codes has yielded by enabling our team
players to recognise one another in the noisy environment.July 25, 2006 16:24 WSPC/Trim Size: 9in x 6in for Review Volume prisoner
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8. Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented our investigations into the use of a team of
players within an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament. We have shown
that if the team players are capable of recognising one another, they can
condition their actions to increase the probability that one of their mem-
bers wins the tournament. Since, outside means of communication are not
available to these players, we have shown that they are able to make use
of a covert channel (speciﬁcally, a pre-agreed sequence of moves that they
make at the start of each interaction) to signal to one another and thus
perform this recognition. By carefully considering both the cost and eﬀec-
tiveness of the signalling, we have shown that we can use error correcting
codes to optimise the performance of the team and that this coding allows
the teams to be extremely eﬀective in the noisy IPD tournament; a noisy
environment which initially appears to preclude their use.
Our future work in this area concerns the use of these team players in
an evolutionary model of the IPD tournament. That is, rather than the
static IPD tournament presented here (where the population of competing
players is ﬁxed), we consider a model where the population of competing
players evolves over time (i.e. the survival of any individual within the
population is dependent on their performance within an IPD tournament
held at each generation). Here we are particularly interested in searching
for evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), and thus are interested whether an
explicit team leader is required (or indeed, can even be implemented) and
how team players may attempt to exploit other team players to their own
advantage. As such, this work attempts to compare the roles of kin selection
and reciprocity for maintaining cooperation in noisy environments.
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Appendix A. Test Population
The test population consists of eighteen players implementing the base
strategies used in the original Axelrod competition (e.g. All C, All D, Ran-
dom and Negative) plus simple strategies that play periodic moves (e.g.
periodic CD, CCD and DDC) and state-of-the-art strategies that have been
shown to outperform these simple strategies (e.g. Adaptive, Forgiving and
Gradual). A full list and description of the strategies adopted by these play-
ers is shown in table 9.6, and table 9.7 shows the results of running noise
free and noisy IPD tournaments using just these players. To ensure repeat-
able results, we run the tournament 1000 times and present the average
results. To allow easy comparison with other publications, we normalise
the scores and thus divide them by the size of the population and the num-
ber of rounds in each IPD game (in this case 200). Thus, the values shown
are the ranked average pay-oﬀ received by the player in each round of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Note, that in this population, tit-for-tat performs relatively poorly and
is easily beaten by a number of strategies. In addition, in general the scores
in the noisy IPD tournament are less than those in the noise free tourna-
ment, since it is far harder to ensure mutual cooperation in the presence of
accidental defections.July 25, 2006 16:24 WSPC/Trim Size: 9in x 6in for Review Volume prisoner
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Table 9.6. Description of the strategies adopted by the competing players in the test
population.
Strategy Name Description
Adaptive ADAP Uses a continuously updated estimate of the
opponent player’s propensity to defect to
condition future actions15.
All C ALLC Cooperates continually.
All D ALLD Defects continually.
Forgiving FORG Modiﬁed tit-for-tat strategy that attempts
to reestablish mutual cooperation after a se-
quence of mutual defections11.
Gradual GRAD Modiﬁed tit-for-tat strategy that use pro-
gressively longer sequences of defections in
retaliation5.
Grim GRIM Cooperates until a strategy defects against
it. From that point on defects continually.
Generous Tit-For-Tat GTFT Like tit-for-tat but cooperates 1/3 of the
times that tit-for-tat would defect4.
Hard Majority HMAJ Plays the majority move of the opponent.
On the ﬁrst move, or when there is a tie, it
cooperates.
Negative NEG Plays the negative of the opponents last
move.
Pavlov PAVL Plays win-stay, lose-shift10.
Periodic CD PCD Plays ‘cooperate, defect’ periodically.
Periodic CCD PCCD Plays ‘cooperate, cooperate, defect’ period-
ically.
Periodic DDC PDDC Plays ‘defect, defect, cooperate’ periodically.
Random RAND Cooperates and defects at random.
Suspicious
Tit-For-Tat
STFT Identical to tit-for-tat but starts by defect-
ing.
Soft Majority SMAJ Plays the majority move of the opponent.
On the ﬁrst move, or when there is a tie, it
defects.
Tit-For-Tat TFT Starts by cooperating and then plays the last
move of the opponent.
Tit-For-Two-Tats TFTT Like tit-for-tat but only defects after two
consecutive defections against it.July 25, 2006 16:24 WSPC/Trim Size: 9in x 6in for Review Volume prisoner
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Table 9.7. Reference performance of the test popu-
lation in the (a) noise free and (b) noisy IPD tourna-
ment. Results are averaged over 1000 repeated tourna-
ments and the standard error of the mean is ±0.002.
(a) (b)
Strategy Score
ADAP 2.888
GRAD 2.860
GRIM 2.773
TFT 2.647
FORG 2.627
GTFT 2.591
SMAJ 2.575
TFTT 2.544
PAVL 2.390
ALLC 2.332
PCD 2.279
HMAJ 2.277
STFT 2.233
PCCD 2.190
ALLD 2.175
RAND 2.114
NEG 2.111
PDDC 2.081
Strategy Score
GRAD 2.410
ADAP 2.329
GRIM 2.297
SMAJ 2.292
ALLD 2.278
TFT 2.245
FORG 2.211
TFTT 2.204
GTFT 2.198
PCCD 2.185
PCD 2.179
STFT 2.155
RAND 2.143
PAVL 2.140
HMAJ 2.134
NEG 2.112
PDDC 2.110
ALLC 2.043